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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the Uips that utter it."*.
PRAGMATISM IN PRACTICE
Recently the highest court of New Hampshire had occasion to change the estab-
lished law in that state with reference to the taxation of decedent's estates where
there was no direction by the testator as to the payment of
Planting the tax. Instead of pro rating the federal estate tax among
a all the distributees as was heretofore the rule [Poster v.
New Seed Farrand, 81 N. H. 448, 128 Atil. 683 (1925)], the court de-
cided that it should be deducted entirely from the residual
estate. It reached this conclusion in the case of Amoskeag Trust Company et at. v.
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 200 Atl. 786 (N. H. 1938). The Supreme Court has
definitely decided that the Federal tax in question is directed against the estate and
not against the interests of the legatee. It was happily phrased by Holmes to be a
statute which taxes "not the interest to which some person succeeds on a death, but
the interest which ceased by reason of the death." Edward v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61,
63 (1923). So defined, the federal government fixes the nature and amount of the
excise tax, but the ultimate apportionment of the amount of such tax is a question
to be determined by the states. Edward v. Slocum, 287 Fed. 651 (1923) aff'd in
Edward v. Slocum, supra. Hence New Hampshire could follow or change its local
law as it saw fit.
The New Hampshire court looked to other states to find their holdings in the
same situation. In Massachusetts, they found guidance in the case of Plunkett v.
The Old Colony Trust Company, 233 Mass. 471, 124 N. E.
The 265, 7 A. L. R. 709 (1919), which held that the tax should
Far Off be deducted and paid out of the residual legacy. Illinois
Hills [People v. Northern Trust Company, 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E.
622 (1919)], and Iowa [Brown's Estate v. Hoge, 198 Iowa
373, 199 N. W. 320 (1924)] have similar rules. Upon a further search, the court
discovered the case of In re Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 497, 124 N. E. 4 (1919), which held
that the entire burden of the Federal Estate Tax should fall upon the residuary
estate. The court found that New Hampshire was one of the very few states that
deducted the Federal Estate Tax pro rata from all of the legatees. Thus, the present
law of New Hampshire is now brought into uniformity with the rules of the majority
of the jurisdictions in this country and with the rule in New York as set down in the
Hamlin case.
Curiously enough, New York, in 1930, abandoned the rule of In re Hamlin and
adopted, by legislation, the now discarded New Hampshire doctrine of apportionment.
This pertinent fact was not mentioned in the Amoskeag
Uprooting case. New York now provides that the Federal Estate Tax
the shall be equitably pro rated among the persons interested in
Cockle the estate to whom property is or may be transferred or to
whom any benefit accrues. N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAw (1930)
§ 124. It was felt after experience with the law New Hampshire has just adopted in
the Amoskeag Trust Company case that the rule did not operate to social advantage.
*Bj ,u=, OBIT DICTA (1885) title page.
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After careful study, the commission appointed to investigate defects in the laws of
estates [EGIs. Doc. (1930) No. 69, pp. 197, 226] in their recommendations, ex-
plained that experience has demonstrated that usually the residuary legatees are
widows, children and more dependent relatives. Before the enactment of the present
New York law, the residual estate had the burden of the entire tax whether by gift,
or inter vivos trust or other forms of transfer taking effect at death. Thus, in many in-
stances the residual legacy wgs greatly depleted by large gifts given during the
lifetime of the testator and not taking effect until his death. As a result many of the
close relatives of the testator were left with almost nothing in their residual estate.
Such forceful support of the present New York statutory rule leads one to wonder
why the New Hampshire court abandoned it. True, New Hampshire has brought
itself into line with many other jurisdictions by its present
By Their Fruits ruling, but it has previously recognized that consistency with
Ye other states is not the only goal of judicial law making. It
Shall Know Them also recognizes social advantage as a goal of law. The court
declares in the Ainoskeag case, "The doctrine of stare decisis
is not one to be either rigidly applied or blindly followed. So used, the doctrine
would nullify that basic principle of the common law whch permits it to grow and
develop to meet new and changing social conditions and would soon render the law
inelastic, archaic, and useless to serve the needs of a dynamic community."
Is there not a lesson to be drawn from this situation? Here is a simple, but
striking, example of the wisdom of stare decisis. Apparently New Hampshire has
uprooted and cast into the fire a rule that thorough studies now show to be prag-
matically the best. Because its eyes gazed so steadily at the verdant green of the
far off hills it missed the rugged beauty of its own fields and forgot they were its
sustenance in the past. Before abandonment of traditional rule New Hampshire
should at least have considered its impressive support by the New York Commission.
Omnnis Innovatio plus Novitate perturbat quam Utilitato prodest.
TERROR VIA THE ETHER
The planet Mars has been the cause of much concern among astronomical scientists
for years. Voluminous tomes have appeared concerning the possibility of life on
that distant globe. It has offered novelists a fertile field,
Playing and now on the wings of a literary effort we find Mars
with Fire taking its place even in the legal stratosphere. An old prob-
lem is resurrected by the recent radio dramatization of H. G.
Wells' scientific thriller, "War of the Worlds". The broadcast was in realistic
news-bulletin style. The presentation told of an attack on the earth by warriors from
Mars and described vividly the ease and rapidity with which their flame-throwers
were "liquidating" our brethren in New Jersey. This dramatization was intended
as an entertaining lid-bit, but " . . . thousands from one end of the country to the
other were frightened out of their wits. . . . " New York Times, Nov. 1, 1938, p.
22, col. 2.
Hence the question is proposed: " . .. if it could be shown that the Columbia
Broadcasting System and Mr. Orson Welles [who prepared, directed and played a
leading role in the skit] should reasonably have anticipated that the program, as
broadcast, might produce wide-spread panic and fear.., could liability for damages
be predicated on such facts?" N. Y. L. J., Nov. 3, 1938, p. 1454, col. 1. As a
general rule, the common law has, from early times, refused to give damages for
mere negligence which produced emotional disturbance alone, whether nervous shock,
fright or mental anguish. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E.
19391
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354 (1896); HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 67. This is, perhaps, best exemplified by the
cases where women have sought damages for shock and emotional disturbance, on
account of being addressed with a proposal of illicit intercourse. The courts have
held that if there is no incidental assault, or battery, recovery is to be denied. Reed
v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S. W. 1079 (1903); Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66
N. Y. Supp. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
But yet courts have allowed a recovery for fright in what are termed the more
outrageous cases, where the fright was followed by illness, such, for example, as was
caused by the defendant's telling a woman, as a practical
The Incendiary joke, that her husband had been smashed up in an accident.
Burned Wilkinson v. Downtown, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57. It would hardly
seem that the Columbia Broadcasting System was guilty of
an outrageous act, for they gave fair warning, in the form of repeated announce-
ments, of the fictional character of the Martian broadcast. But judging from the
terror that was rampant, the broadcasting officials should have been more alive to
the probable results of such an unusual mode of radio dramatization. Not all members
of a radio audience tune in at the beginning of the program. Consequently, the true
import of a program is often distorted. Despite this factor, it is unlikely that litiga-
tion would prove successful. However, the cure would seem to be a more rigid
control of this type program, or, failing this, its complete elimination as a broadcast
possibility.
The reason sometimes given in defense of the rule which forbids recovery for
shock or fright alone, where the defendant is guilty only of ordinary negligence, is
that it would be " . . . impractical and speculative to permit recovery for harms
purely psychological and emotional .... " HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 67. If recovery
were allowed in all cases of emotional disturbance, the result might well be a gold
rush to the courts. Suffering as many of us do from coffee-nerves, the terrific possi-
bilities of such a rule are apparent. As a nation, we might rapidly degenerate into
chronic swooners, and in such case, the consequences might prove much more trying
than an actual attack from Mars. Such a state of affairs might also curb human
initiative. Those engaged in literary compositions, the moving-picture producers and
directors of programs to be transmitted over the ether waves might well consider
the possibility of mass consternation resulting from too vivid portrayals of disaster,
horror or acute danger.
However, our legal tribunals should not completely disregard the rights of the
individual. One should be able to proceed in his affairs knowing that his right to be
free from aggressions upon his peace of mind will receive
For Quiet ample legal protection. Magruder, Mental Disturbance in
Firesides Torts (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rv. 1033; Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage (1922) 20 Micr. L. Rnv. 497.
rhere are situations where a more liberal application of legal principles, which would
protect the individual against outrageous aggressions on his mental state, seems
desirable. Such liberal interpretation would obviate, the necessity of the courts resort-
ing to mental gymnastics to find the physical contact, intentional act or consequent
physical impairment necessary to satisfy the current strict rule.
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